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Abstract
This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the
formation of the public agenda. An incumbent government and a chal-
lenger party in opposition compete in elections by choosing the issues that
will key out their campaigns. Giving salience to an issue implies propos-
ing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo. Parties
trade oﬀ the issues with high salience in voters’ concerns and those with
broad agreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects
a higher probability of victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in
the voters’ decision. But remarkably, the issues which are considered the
most important ones by a majority of votes may not be given salience
during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survive in
spite of its bad policy performance if there is no suﬃciently broad agree-
ment on a policy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the
model with the case of the United States presidential election in 2004.
Keywords: Agenda, elections, political competition, issues, salience, agreement.
JEL classification: D72
∗Higher Council for Scientiﬁc Research (IAE-CSIC) and Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
†Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE.
Corresponding author: humberto.llavador@upf.edu
11 Introduction
On the occasion of the United States presidential election in 2004, former pres-
ident Bill Clinton, who was not running as candidate, stated: “Generally, the
presidential elections in the United States turn always around three questions.
First: how one would feel at having that person as president?... As second ele-
ment there is the candidate’s position on certain issues. The third factor is the
following: What is this election about? Is it about the United States having a
multilateral attitude in foreign policy? Or is it whether taxes should be lowered
for the rich or more should be done for the poor?”
In this paper we focus on the third factor: what elections are about. Just
to mention an illustration of the relevance of the selection of issues during the
electoral campaign, let us also quote somebody involved in the November 4th,
2008 U.S. presidential election. This was published at the beginning of Septem-
ber, just after the two party conventions, when the survey polls showed a close
tie between the two main candidates: “’If in October we’re talking about Russia
and national defense and who can manage America in a diﬃcult world, John
McCain will be president’, predict[ed] Thomas Rath, the leading Republican
strategist in the swing state of New Hampshire. ‘If we’re talking largely about
domestic issues and health care, Barack Obama probably will be president’.
Events can aﬀect that conversation. If Russia invades another country on Oct.
20 or Iran detonates a nuclear weapon, advantage McCain; if there’s another
Bear Stearns meltdown, or a stock market crash, put a few points on the Obama
side.” (Albert R. Hunt, ‘Letter from Washington’, New York Times, Sep. 8th,
2008). Indeed, one month later, during the third Presidential Debate in Oc-
tober 15th, Barak Obama pointed out that “Senator McCain’s own campaign
said publicly last week that, if we keep on talking about the economic crisis, we
lose, so we need to change the subject.”
This paper discusses the criteria for party choices of issues and the subse-
quent campaign outcomes. We present a formal model of electoral competition
focusing on the formation of the public agenda, in which political parties or
candidates compete to win an election by choosing an issue and a policy posi-
tion on that issue to which they try to give political salience. Giving salience
to an issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal on the issue as an
alternative to the status-quo policy, as well as talking about it, usually with a
value or argument, and making it news with some eﬀort investment in order to
making it relevant for voters’ electoral decisions.
A party will choose a priority issue to campaign for if it is a likely winning
issue, that is, it has a likely winning position and it is likely to become decisive
in the election. Whether an issue will become a winning issue depends on two
variables: (i) the ex-ante ‘pre-campaign or social salience’ of the issue in voters’
concerns and (ii) the voters’ support or ‘agreement’ in favor of an alternative
policy proposal on the issue.
Thus, parties have to trade oﬀ the two variables. If one issue is highly salient
in the voters’ concerns, but voters are highly divided about which one of the
possible policy alternatives to the status-quo is better, choosing to campaign
1on the issue by holding one of the policy alternatives may be risky. If, on the
contrary, there is broad social agreement about the best policy alternative to
the status-quo on one issue, but the issue is not a priority for voters’ electoral
decision, running on that issue can attract little attention. Hence, whether
parties compete by raising the same issue and proposing two diﬀerent policy
alternatives on it or by choosing diﬀerent issues does not depend only on voters’
priority concerns, but also on each party’s likelihood to hold potentially winning
policy positions. It is always possible that the issues which are considered the
most important ones by a majority of voters be not given political salience by
parties during the electoral campaign.
This may be a surprising result, but it may be a reasonable one after all.
Important issues in people’s concerns can, thus, be solved through electoral
competition only when a policy alternative appears as clearly superior to voters’
eyes. In the absence of a majority agreement on a best policy alternative, parties
can choose not to give salience to the issue, thus maintaining the status-quo
policy even if it is unsatisfactory for voters. As a more worrisome consequence,
mediocre policies broadly rejected by the electorate, as well as incumbent parties
with no good performance in government, may survive.
Foundational works about the importance of agenda-setting in competitive
elections include the well-known contributions by Stokes (1963) and Petrocik
(1996). They depart in important aspects from the standard ‘spatial theory’
of electoral competition, in which parties or candidates compete by choosing
policy ‘positions’ on a space which is basically given. There are also a number
of collections and analysis of empirical data on issues in electoral platforms
(including Riker 1993; Budge 1993; Budge et al. 2001; Petrocik et al. 2003;
Klingemann et al. 2006; see the critical review of the literature by Colomer
and Puglisi 2005); Baumgartner and Jones (2009) and www.policyagendas.org
develop and encompassing project on policy agendas including broad empirical
material potentially to be analyzed with the framework presented in this article.
However, not a formal model has been elaborated, to our knowledge, which
speciﬁes the structural and strategic conditions in which political parties or
candidates choose issues in the electoral campaign and shape the relevant policy
space.1 We discuss these conditions and analyze the type of issues –as deﬁned
for their salience in voters’ concerns and the acceptation of policy proposals on
them— which should be expected to be chosen in equilibrium
The plan for the rest of the paper is the following. In section 2 we present
a spatial model of agenda formation in which parties compete on one issue
at a time. For each issue there is some probability of victory for the party
holding the most popular policy alternative. We introduce the concepts of issue
salience and the degree of agreement on the policy alternative to the status-
quo. Section 3 describes issues in the salience-agreement space, and section 4
presents the equilibrium results. Section 5 provides several examples showing
1Amor´ os and Puy (2007) and Amor´ os and Puy (2010) present a complementary study to
our analysis. While the present paper focuses on the selection of issues, in their papers the
salient issues are given and they study the allocation of resources to change the saliency in
voters’ preferences.
2that parties can compete on issues with either high salience or broad agreement
or both. They do not compete on issues with both low salience among voters
and low agreement on the best policy alternative. However, parties may choose
not to campaign on those issues with highest salience in voters’ concerns, thus
postponing solutions to unpopular status-quo policies with considerable social
discontent. In section 6, as an illustration, we discuss the choice of campaign
issues for the 2004 United States presidential election in the light of the ﬁndings
in the model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an incumbent party in government (G) and a challenger party in op-
position (O) that compete to win an election by choosing an issue and a pol-
icy position on that issue. There are N potential issues, and for each issue
i = 1,...,N, there exists a status-quo policy (qi) and two innovative policy
proposals located on diﬀerent sides of qi, which can be called xi and yi respec-
tively. If the issue is, for example, taxes, one of the alternatives implies higher
taxes, and the other lower taxes, than the status-quo, and similarly for any
other issue, so that the two alternatives are on diﬀerent sides of the status-quo.
That is, either xi < qi < yi or yi < qi < xi. Denote by Ai = {xi,qi,yi} the set
alternatives on issue i.2
2.1 Electorate
Voters have convex preferences over the feasible set of policy alternatives and
we assume sincere voting on each issue. For an issue i, let Fi(ai,a′
i) be the
fraction of citizens who prefer alternative ai to a′
i, implied by their induced
preferences once keeping all other issues constant at the status-quo. Denote
by Fx
i = Fi(xi,qi) and by F
y
i = Fi(yi,qi) the support for each one of the
alternatives against the status-quo. For simplicity, assume that Fx
i  = F
y
i and





The assumption that innovative policy proposals are on diﬀerent sides of
the status-quo implies, by the convexity of preferences, that voters who favor
alternative ai prefer the status-quo to the other alternative a′
i. Formally, pref-
erences satisfy that, ﬁxing the policy on all other issues, if xi ≻ qi then qi ≻ yi.
And similarly, if yi ≻ qi, then qi ≻ xi.3 Intuitively, this means, for example,
2A minimum of three alternatives, with at least one position on each side of the status-quo
for each issue, are necessary to obtain a surviving status-quo because of a divided electorate on
the best alternative. Nevertheless, the main results from this three-alternative model would
continue to hold in a framework where each issue admits a ﬁnite number of distinct positions.
Therefore, we side with Krasa and Polborn (2010) in arguing that “a setup with very few
feasible positions on each issue is actually a quite realistic description of political campaigns”
(p.2).
3For the present analysis we only require that the previous conditions on induced prefer-
ences hold when all other issues are ﬁxed at the status-quo. Hence, convexity of preferences
is a stronger assumption than needed.
3that voters who would like lower taxes would vote against a tax increase by
supporting the status-quo.
2.2 The probability of winning on an issue
The winning alternative on a particular issue i is the one receiving a majority
of votes. Following the literature on electoral uncertainty (Wittman, 1983), we
assume that parties face uncertainty on the outcome of the election, and no
alternative wins with probability one. For simplicity, we postulate a generic
probability of victory function satisfying a very undemanding condition.4
Deﬁnition 1 Let πi : Ai×Ai → (0,1) be the probability of victory on issue
i function, with πi(ai,a′
i) representing the probability of victory of aiagainst a′
i.
Assume that, for each alternative policy, the probability of defeating the
status-quo is increasing in the fraction of supporters for that alternative. For-
mally, denote by πx
i = πi(xi,qi) and π
y
i = πi(yi,qi) the probabilities that al-







i), with ϕ′ > 0. In particular, we do not make any assumption on
πi(xi,yi), and hence there is no need to specify how voters favoring qi would
split if they had to choose between the two alternatives xi and yi. For simplicity




i, it follows that πx
i > π
y
i , that is x is the advantaged
alternative on issue i. Without loss of generality, we can sort the issuesi =
1,...,N according to the probability of victory of the advantaged alternative.
We assume for simplicity a strict ordering:
πx
1 > πx
2 >     > πx
N−1 > πx
N. (1)
Suppose that one party has proposed alternative ai ∈ Ai on issue i . Given
the sequential play analyzed in this paper, we will assume that the other party
cannot win by proposing exactly the same alternative on the same issue. For-
mally, πi(ai,ai) = 0 for the last party proposing alternative ai. This implies
that a party proposing a policy alternative on one issue forces the other party
to defend something diﬀerent if it wants to compete on that same issue.
Combined with the idea that the status-quo belongs to the government,
this condition implies that the opposition party cannot defeat an incumbent
government on an issue by defending the status-quo, unless the government has
proposed ﬁrst an alternative policy.
4See Chapter 2 in Roemer (2001) for several models of electoral uncertainty which derive
a probability of victory function consistent with our setting.
5None of the qualitative results hinges on this assumption that we make to simplify the
exposition.
42.3 Issue salience and level of agreement on the policy
alternative
Each issue is characterized by some social or pre-campaign salience, which re-
ﬂects voters’ concerns, and by some agreement on the best policy alternative.
Pre-campaign salience and policy agreement are both derived from voters’ pref-
erences.
The preferences of voters regarding which issues should be more important
in the election can be formed through personal experiences, media emphases,
interest groups’ promotions or uncontrolled events. But it seems logical that the
degree of salience in voters’ perception should be related to the degree of social
discontent with the status-quo policy on the issue. In this sense, we measure
the salience of issue i in an inverse relation to the support or consensus with the




disagree on the prevailing status-quo on the issue.




However, social discontent with the status-quo, and hence high salience, does
not necessarily imply a broad agreement on the best policy alternative. It may
be, on the contrary, that voters are highly divided on which alternative would
be better than the status-quo. We measure the level of agreement as the share





i). Normalizing this measure to range from 0 to 1, we obtain6
Deﬁnition 3 Deﬁne the level of agreement among discontented voters











Therefore, the maximum value of ζi is 1, when there is total agreement on
the best alternative to the status-quo (i.e. F
y
i = 0), and the minimum value of
ζi is 0, when the discontented electorate is evenly split between the alternatives




2.4 Post-campaign or political salience
In order to make an issue decisive in the election, parties try to make it ‘salient’
in voters’ decision by giving it political salience. Parties confer political salience
by campaigning on the issue and proposing a policy alternative to the status-
quo. Let us call the political salience or post-campaign salience of issue k the
probability that k becomes the decisive issue once parties have campaigned on
issues i and j.








such that ζi(0) = 0 and
ζi(1/2) = 1 .
5Deﬁnition 4 Deﬁne the post-campaign salience or political salience of issue
k when parties have politicized issues i and j, sij(k), as the probability that issue
k becomes the decisive issue.
We impose the following assumptions on the measure of political salience.
First, parties can give political salience to an issue only by proposing a policy
alternative to the status-quo. This implies that issues not raised in the electoral
campaign do not get salience and hence cannot be decisive. Secondly, if both
parties decide to campaign on the same issue, then it becomes the decisive issue
since it is the only issue raised during the electoral campaign. Finally, if parties
give political salience to two diﬀerent issues, the probability for each issue to
become decisive equals its relative salience.
Assumption 1 Given a pair of issues, i,j, chosen by the government and the
opposition parties:
1. sij(k) = 0 for all k / ∈ {i,j},
2. sii(i) = 1 for all i = 1,    ,N,
3. sij(i) = σi
σi+σj for all i  = j.
It follows that for any pair of diﬀerent issues, sij(i) = 1 − sij(j). We will
write sij = sij(i) whenever there is no ambiguity.
2.5 The expected probability of electoral victory
Parties want to win the election. Observe that parties face uncertainty on the
identity of the decisive issue as well as on the winning position on each issue. The
probability of electoral victory equals the probability of winning with an issue
times the probability that the issue will be decisive in the election. When parties
compete on the same issue, this issue becomes decisive and their probability of
victory coincides with their probability of holding the winning policy position
on that issue. When parties campaign on diﬀerent issues, the probability of
victory is the expected probability of holding the winning policy position on the
decisive issue.
Deﬁnition 5 Deﬁne the expected probability of victory Π for a party propos-










j) if j = i
sij πi(ai,qi) + (1 − sij)(1 − πj(a′
j,qj)) if i  = j
. (2)
Remember that this deﬁnition presumes that voters associate to the status









issues i and j
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Figure 1: Game tree. The ﬁnal nodes represent the issues with political salience
and the expected probability of victory for the incumbent government G.
2.6 Timing and equilibrium
The political game consists of choosing policy issues and alternatives to compete
on for the next election. It develops sequentially, following some order of play.
(See ﬁgure 1.) We give the incumbent government the ﬁrst-mover advantage,
capturing that governments can act while opposition parties can only make
promises. Nevertheless, the order of play is not relevant for our results since it
does not aﬀect the set of issues chosen, but who chooses them, a feature we do
not exploit. Hence, ﬁrst we let the government party choose either to take the
initiative and not wait (nw) or to wait (w). Taking the initiative means that the
government party chooses one issue i on which it proposes a policy alternative
to the status-quo ai ∈ Ai, ai  = qi. Then the opposition party can ﬁght the
government party’s proposal either by defending the status quo qi, by defending
the other alternative on the issue, or by devoting its eﬀorts to raising another
issue j on which to propose a policy alternative a′
j  = qj,j  = i.7 If, on the
contrary, the government chooses waiting, the opposition can choose one issue
c on which to propose a policy alternative to the status-quo bc ∈ Ac,bc  = qc.
Then the government party can either compete on the issue or raise a new issue
k (with b′
k  = qk,k  = c).
7Proposing the same alternative ai or the status-quo on a diﬀerent issue qj,j  = i, are
strictly dominated strategies yielding zero probability of victory.
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Figure 2: The set of feasible pairs of issue salience and policy agreement.
3 The issue salience-policy agreement space.




i). Alternatively, from deﬁnitions 2 and 3, we can describe issues by their
degree of salience (σi) and level of agreement (ζi). And for a given pre-campaign






Figure 2 represents the issue salience and policy agreement space. We can
identify three diﬀerent areas. First, the rectangle ABEO captures all those
issues which take relatively low salience among voters’ pre-campaign concerns
(σi < 1/2) thus implying relatively high support for the status-quo policies
on the issues (1 − Fx
i − F
y
i > 1/2). Given the high social consensus on the
status-quo, it is unlikely that innovative policies are electorally successful (their
probability of defeating the status-quo is less than one half) and parties will
tend not to choose them in priority.
Second, the area BDE includes all those issues with relatively high salience
(σi > 1/2), but relatively low agreement on an alternative policy to the status-
quo. This area is deﬁned by the line ζi = (1 − σi)/σi which represents those
issues whose probability of defeating the status-quo is exactly 1/2 (that is,
Fx
i = 1/2). For those issues below this line ζi < (1 − σi)/σi, and any policy
alternative has a probability of victory against the status-quo less than 1/2.
Finally, the area BCD in the upper-right corner encompasses all those is-
sues which take relatively high salience (σi > 1/2) and on which there is
relatively broad agreement on the best policy alternative to the status-quo
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Figure 3: Issue alternatives with iso-probability of defeating the status-quo.
(ζi > (1 − σi)/σi). This area corresponds to the set of likely successful issues.
Proposition 1 An issue i exhibits πx
i > 1/2 if and only if σi > 1/2 and ζi >
(1 − σi)/σi.
Proof: See Appendix. ￿
In the salience-agreement space of ﬁgure 2, we could draw a map of level
curves for diﬀerent probabilities of defeating the status-quo.8 Each curve in-
cludes all the combinations of issue saliencies and agreements on a policy alter-
native producing the same probability to win the election. In ﬁgure 3 we have
represented several of those curves for the simple case where πx
i = Fx
i . The
closer is the curve to the upper right corner, the higher the probability that
campaigning on any of the issues located on the curve will defeat the status-
quo. We will use this representation later in the paper to discuss examples of
the party’s choice of diﬀerent issues in their electoral campaigns.
8Formally, letting l(¯ πx) be the set of issues whose favored alternative defeats the status-
quo with probability ¯ πx, we can write l(¯ πx) =
 
(σi,ζi) ∈ [0,1]2 : ζi =
 
2ϕ−1






i ) is the probability that xi defeats qi when a fraction Fx
i of voters favor
xi .
94 Equilibrium results
We focus the analysis on subgame perfect equilibria, the standard concept in
sequential games with complete information. Such equilibria are characterized
by:
1. the government choosing:
i) either taking the initiative or waiting,
ii) a policy alternative on one issue in case of taking the initiative,
iii) and a strategy in response to each possible policy alternative pro-
posed by the opposition;
and by
2. an opposition choosing:
i) a strategy in response to each policy alternative proposed by the
government in case the government takes the initiative, and
ii) a policy alternative on one issue to propose in case the incumbent
government does wait.
The strategies must be optimal responses in each subgame. Being a ﬁnite,
zero-sum game, a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists and parties have
the same probability of victory in all equilibria.
Following standard backward induction, we start by ﬁnding the optimal
actions of the players at each ﬁnal decision node and continue working back to
the beginning of the game.
4.1 Subgames Γw and Γnw
Let Γw and Γnw be the two proper subgames following the incumbent’s choice
of taking the initiative or waiting. (Their initial nodes are labeled as λnw and
λw in Figure 1.) These two subgames are symmetric, and hence it suﬃces to
analyze only one of them. Denote the ﬁrst mover of each subgame (G in Γnw
and O in Γw) as player 1, and the second mover as player 2. The following
proposition and its corollary characterize the best response correspondence for
player 2.
Proposition 2 Let BR(xi) be the set of best responses of player 2 to the pro-
posal xi by player 1. Then
1. qi ∈ BR(xi) if and only if 1 − πx
i ≥ maxk =i πx
k.










k − (1 − πx
i ))ski for all k  = i,j.
10Proof: See Appendix. ￿
An implication of proposition 2 is that the best response is independent of
the pre-campaign salience σi, and thus of the degree of social discontent with
the status-quo policy, whether the best response is defending the status quo or
raising a new issue. This result will also hold in the full game, as discussed
below.
Corollary 1 Consider the policy proposal xi ∈ Ai.
1. If i > 1, then
BR(xi) =

     
     
qi if πx
i < 1 − πx
1,
{qi,x1} if πx





i > 1 − πx
1.
(4)
2. For i = 1,
BR(x1) =

     
     
q1 if πx
2 < 1 − πx
1,
{q1,x2} if πx





2 > 1 − πx
1.
(5)
Proof: See Appendix. ￿
4.2 The full game
Consider the full game where the incumbent party may either take the initiative
and propose a policy alternative on some issue (and hence play the subgame
Γnw), or hold to the current situation and wait for the challenger to propose
some alternative (and play subgame Γw).
As the following theorem shows, the equilibrium depends only on the two
issues with the highest probabilities of victory. Whether parties compete on
the same issue or raise diﬀerent issues is independent of the pre-campaign issue
salience, which reﬂects voters’ concerns.
Theorem 1 Consider an agenda-setting political competition game.
1. If πx
1 ≤ 1/2 or πx
1 ≥ 1 − πx
1 > πx




2 > 1 − πx
1, then parties focus on diﬀerent issues.
11Proof: See Appendix. ￿
The intuition is not diﬃcult to grasp. If there is not a good (likely success-
ful) issue on which to propose a new policy alternative (πx
1 ≤ 1/2), then, at
equilibrium, the government waits and defends the status-quo on all issues. If
there is a single best-alternative which is better than defending the status-quo
and much better than any other alternative (πx
1 ≥ 1 − πx
1 > πx
2), then the
government takes the initiative and proposes that policy alternative, while the
opposition is forced to defend the status-quo on the issue. Finally, if there are
promising policy alternatives on two issues (πx
1 > πx
2 > 1−πx
1), the two parties
raise diﬀerent issues.
Equilibrium results can be presented in terms of issue salience and agreement
on the policy alternative.
Theorem 2 Consider an agenda-setting electoral competition game in which
parties choose issues to be raised during the electoral campaign; σi is the degree
of issue salience and ζi is the degree of agreement on a policy alternative to the
status quo on issue i.
1. Let σ1 < 1/2, then both parties focus on the same issue. The degree of
issue salience is low (all the issues are within the rectangle ABEO in the
ﬁgure 2). The government defends the status-quo on all issues and the
opposition chooses the best issue to challenge the status-quo. They may
not choose the most salient issue.
2. Let σ1 > 1/2, but ζ1 < (1 − σ1)σ1, then both parties focus on the same
issue. Some issue takes high salience among voters, but there is no broad
agreement on the best policy alternative to the status quo on the issue (all
the issues are within the set ABDO in ﬁgure 2, with some in BDE), the
opposition chooses the issue on which a policy alternative has the highest
support, and the government defends the status-quo on all issues. They
may not choose the most salient issue.
3. Let σ1 > 1/2 and ζ1 > (1 − σ1)σ1, then the government chooses an issue
with high salience and broad policy agreement. If there exists another
issue with suﬃcient salience and agreement on the best policy alternative
to the status-quo, the opposition chooses that issue and parties focus on
diﬀerent issues. The most salient issue may not be chosen. Otherwise
the government proposes the best policy on the most salient issue and the
opposition defends the status-quo on that issue.
Proof: See Appendix. ￿
The following results show that the incumbent government can beneﬁt from
a higher probability of winning and always chooses an issue with relatively high
salience and broad agreement (within the set BCD in ﬁgure 2), if there is any.
Corollary 2 Let ρ = maxi minj =i ΠG(xi,xj). The incumbent government wins
with probability max{ρ,1 − ρ} > 1/2.
12Proof: See Appendix. ￿
Proposition 3 Suppose there exists at least one issue i with σi > 1/2 and
ζi > (1 − σi)/σi, then the issue chosen by the government at equilibrium exhibits
both high salience and broad policy agreement, σG > 1/2 and ζG > (1 − σG)/σG.
Proof: See Appendix. ￿
However, it is interesting to note that we cannot extend this latest result to
the opposition, which may have to choose an issue with low salience or low level
of agreement. To see this, consider the following case.
Example. Consider an election in which three potential issues have the following














which corresponds to the following salience and policy agreement values:
(σ1,ζ1) = (0.85,0.647);(σ2,ζ2) = (0.65,0.569);(σ3,ζ3) = (0.9,0.089).
By proposition 3 the government will not choose issue 2 because the degree
of policy agreement is low: ζ3 < (1 − σ3)/σ3 = 0.11. In fact, the incumbent
government will take the initiative and choose issue 1, which is more salient and
has broader agreement than issue 2. However, for the opposition to choose an
issue, it is relevant to see that on issue 2 there is broader policy agreement than
on issue 3, but issue 2 is much less salient. In this case, the trade-oﬀ is favorable
to issue 3, in spite of having low agreement. At equilibrium, the opposition does
not choose issue 2, which has both high salience and broad agreement, σ2 > 1/2
and ζ2 > (1 − σ2)/σ2 = 0.538, but chooses x3 instead.9 Hence proposition 3
does not apply to the opposition party.
Finally, observe that proposition 3 also shows that the only situation in
which we can guarantee that the most salient issue is brought up during the
electoral campaign is when there is broad agreement on the best alternative in
this issue and all other issues show very low salience.
5 Examples
We provide a few numerical examples to illustrate how parties competing in
setting the electoral agenda can overlook the concerns of the electorate, as rep-
resented by issue salience, by choosing either to defend an unpopular status-quo
on the issue or not talking about it at all.






i , and compute equilibria using
Mathematica. The program code can be obtained from the authors by request.
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Figure 4: Example 1: Neither the most salient nor the most consensual issues
are chosen.
5.1 Neither the most salient issue nor the most consen-
sual issues are chosen
Consider an election with four potential issues whose distribution of support
















which corresponds to the following salience and policy agreement values:
(σ1,ζ1) = (0.65,1.00); (σ2,ζ2) = (0.88,0.432);
(σ3,ζ3) = (0.91,0.34); (σ4,ζ4) = (0.99,0.03),
as represented in ﬁgure 4.
In equilibrium, government and opposition focus on diﬀerent issues, 2 and
3 respectively. Speciﬁcally, the government takes the initiative and announces
x2 and the opposition responds by choosingx3. Both parties overlook issue 4,
which is the most salient issue (99% of the electorate are against the status-
quo), and issue 1, which is the one with highest agreement (everybody in favor
of changing the status-quo agrees on the alternative policy). Nevertheless, they
focus on issues with either higher levels of agreement than issue 4 or more
salience than issue 1.
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Figure 5: Example 2: Parties may focus on the least salient issue.
5.2 Parties may focus on the least salient issue
Consider an election in which three potential issues have the following distribu-











which corresponds to the following salience and policy agreement values:
(σ1,ζ1) = (0.52,0.96);(σ2,ζ2) = (0.84,0.048);(σ3,ζ3) = (0.79,0.012),
as represented in ﬁgure 5.
The government chooses issue 1, the only one in BCD (recall proposition
3). The opposition does not choose issues 2 or 3 for lack of agreement on the
best policy on those issues, but it rather challenges the government on the same
issue 1. The electoral campaign focuses on the least salient issue. If the issue
chosen by the government, issue 1, beneﬁted from signiﬁcantly broader policy
agreement and were, thus, a more secure issue, the opposition would choose
another issue (issue 2 in the example).
In this case, the opposition does not challenge the highly unsatisfactory
status-quo policies on issues 2 and 3 (with around 80% of electorate in favor of
changing the status-quo) as they lack voters’ agreement on the best alternative.
These are just speciﬁc examples to show possible occurrences. To approach
more general results, we can note that parties will never choose the issue with
both the lowest salience and the highest controversy or lowest agreement on the
appropriate policy alternative. But regarding highly salient issues, if there is
15not suﬃciently broad agreement on a policy alternative, the opposition party
may choose not to challenge a highly unsatisfactory status-quo policy and the
incumbent government may survive in spite of its bad policy performance.
6 Illustration
Some features of the model could be illustrated with cases from the real world if
the basic variables –pre-campaign issue salience in voters’ concerns and agree-
ment in favor of one of the policy alternatives on each issue– could be oper-
ationalized with data from survey polls and electoral campaigns. Just as an
informal example to show the analytical potential of the model let us take the
United States presidential election in 2004.
This case seems suﬃciently close to our assumptions regarding a two party
competition for a single oﬃce by plurality rule. Several survey polls asked vot-
ers to identify the most important issues in the 2004 U.S. presidential election.
Observers broadly coincide in identifying ‘moral values’, ‘the economy’, ‘terror-
ism’, and ‘the Iraq war’, in this order, followed by others with minor impact
such as ‘health care’, ‘taxes’, and ‘education’. Broad agreement was obtained
in favor of the alternatives promoted by the Republicans on ‘terrorism’, ‘moral
values’ and ‘taxes’, in this order, and in favor of the alternatives promoted by
the Democrats on ‘the economy’, ‘health care’, ‘education’, and ‘the Iraq war’,
also in this order. (See National Election Pool, 2004; Stroud and Kenski, 2007,
as well as similar operazionalizations for previous elections by RePass, 1971; Mc-
Combs and Zhu, 1995; Burden and Sanberg, 2003, and discussion by Wlezien,
2005).
Regarding the actual choice of issues during the electoral campaign by the
two major candidates, Republican George W. Bush and Democrat John Kerry,
there is also high coincidence in the academic literature. On the basis of people’s
responses to the ‘most important issue’ question, Weisberg (2005) conjectured
that “people who supported Bush naturally would have chosen terrorism as
their top concern. Kerry argued that the Iraq war was a diversion from the
ﬁght against Al Qaeda, so his supporters would likely have chosen Iraq as their
ﬁrst concern.” (p. 784). While indeed Democratic activists and opinion-makers
pressured in favor of Kerry campaigning mainly about ‘Iraq’ in response to
Bush’s emphasis on ‘terrorism’, polls show that most people agreed with the
statement that the Iraq war was part of the war on terrorism (as observed by
Norpoth and Sidman, 2007).
However, while Bush indeed chose ‘terrorism’ as the ﬁrst issue, Kerry did
not focus on ‘Iraq’, but on ‘the economy’. “George W. Bush ran for re-election
as a war-time president, emphasizing the importance of staying the course on
the ‘War on Terrorism’. At the same time, the economy had not fully recovered
from the recession, and the job picture remained lackluster; his opponent, John
Kerry, stressed the economy and other domestic issues such as health care”
(Weisberg, 2005, page 777; see also Weisberg and Christenson, 2007).
Other empirical analysis conﬁrm the basic traits just remarked. According
16to Abramson et al. (2005), vote decisions were based largely upon retrospec-
tive evaluation of Bush as a successful president and as a leader who would
be successful in combating terrorism, while moral values and social issues had
low importance. In a close analysis, it is noted that as the threat of terrorism
remained a substantial concern through election day and aﬀorded Bush an over-
whelming advantage, although the state of the economy and the war in Iraq were
viewed negatively by most voters (Abramson et al., 2007). In another stance by
Campbell (2005), it is remarked that the inﬂuence of the campaign was aﬀected
by major concerns that Kerry would not handle the war on terrorism as well as
Bush, while there were more divided views about the economy and Iraq.
We can observe that none of the candidates chose to campaign in priority for
the issue which could have higher pre-campaign salience among voters, ‘moral
values’. Numerous observers noted that, in spite of pundits’ comments, ‘moral
values’ ranked low in the issues list predicting actual voters’ choices at the end
of the electoral campaign (for instance, Langer and Cohen, 2005). Republican
candidate George W. Bush, instead of choosing this issue, on which he obtained
relatively high support and advantage regarding the other candidate, chose the
one in which his policy had the highest support, even if it was considered less
important by the voters, ‘terrorism’. Democratic candidate John Kerry did not
choose in priority the issue ‘Iraq’, which, as mentioned, would have been a direct
response to the initiative in favor of ‘terrorism’ taken by Bush, apparently for
lack of agreement on the best alternative policy. He instead chose the issue in
which he could obtain the highest agreement, ‘economy/jobs’. Both candidates
gave, thus, priority to those issues in which they could expect more popular
agreement with their policy alternatives among the voters and higher advantage
regarding the other candidate, rather than those which were more salient in
voters’ concerns.
7 Conclusion
We have presented an agenda-setting model of electoral competition in which
parties choose to give salience and campaign on those issues on which they
expect their policy proposals will obtain voters’ broad support.
Parties have to trade oﬀ the pre-campaign salience of each issue in voters’
concerns and the voters’ support or agreement in favor of the policy alternatives
on the issue. We have found that, although parties will not compete on irrelevant
issues (those with both low salience among voters and divisive policy proposals),
indeed the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority
of votes may not be given salience during the electoral campaign.
As we noted at the beginning, this may be surprising, but not unreasonable
one after all. Even if there is extensive public concern on some issue, if there
is not a single policy proposal on the issue which can attract broad agreement,
focusing on that issue might produce high division and polarization among both
parties and voters.
In the short term, mediocre policies broadly rejected by the electorate, as
17well as incumbent parties with no good performance in government, may survive
for lack of a suﬃciently convincing alternative. Since parties tend to choose to
campaign on issues on the basis of relatively popular policies, in the long term
broad policy consensus can be accumulated on an increasing number of issues.
But since parties do not always choose to campaign on the issues with the highest
pre-electoral salience, the political agenda may successively select, address and
settle policy issues in an order which may not correspond to their importance
in voters’ concerns.
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Appendix: Proofs
A Proof of Proposition 1
Because πx
i = ϕ(Fx
i ) with ϕ′ > 0and ϕ(1/2) = 1/2, it suﬃces to show that
Fx
i > 1/2 if and only if σi > 1/2 and ζi > (1 − σi)σi.
1. Let Fx
i > 1/2. Then σi > 1/2 (deﬁnition 2). Because ζi is increasing in
Fx
i , then ζi > (1 − σi)σi, where we have substituted Fx
i = 1/2 in (3).
2. Let σi > 1/2. From (3), we can obtain Fx
i = σi (1 + ζi)/2. Hence, Fx
i >




B Proof of Proposition 2
1. We know that qi ∈ BR(xi) if an only if Π2(qi,xi) ≥ Π2(xk,xi) for all
k  = i. That is, if and only if 1 − πx
i ≥ ski πx
k + (1 − ski)(1 − πx
i ) for all
j  = k.
Since ski ∈ (0,1), the inequality holds if and only if 1 − πx
i ≥ πx
k,∀k  = i,
which is equivalent to the condition in the statement: 1−πx
i ≥ maxk =i πx
k.
2. Similarly, xj ∈ BR(xi) if and only if it is better than choosing the
status-quo in i (Π2 (xj,xi) ≥ Π2 (qi,xi)) and better than choosing a pol-
icy alternative in another issue k  = i,j (Π2 (xj,xi) ≥ Π2 (xk,xi)). The
ﬁrst condition is equivalent to sji πx
j + (1 − sji)(1 − πx
i ) ≥ 1 − πx
i , that
is, πx
j ≥ 1 − πx
i . The second condition implies that for all k  = i,j,
sji πx
j + (1 − sji)(1 − πx
i ) ≥ ski πx









k − (1 − πx
i ))ski.
￿




i for all i > 2. Observe that
Π(xj,xi) = sjiπ
x
j + (1 − sji)(1 − π
x
i ) = (1 − π
x
i ) + sji(π
x
j − (1 − π
x
i )).




j − (1 − πx
i )
 
, namely, the expression in part 2 of proposition
2. Therefore, the results follow directly from proposition 2. ￿
D Proof of Theorem 1
We proceed case by case.
1. Let πx
1 ≤ 1/2. Then πx
i < πx
1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1 − πx
1 ∀i > 1. It follows from
corollary 1 that BR(xk) = qk for all issue k, implying that both parties
compete on the same issue.
2. Let πx
1 ≥ 1 − πx
1 > πx
2. Then 1 − πx
1 > πx
i for all i > 1. From corollary 1,
BR(xi) = qi for all i , and hence both parties compete on the same issue.
3. Let πx
1 > πx
2 > 1 − πx
1. Let (a∗
1,a∗
2) be the policy alternatives of an equi-
librium outcome. We only need to show that a∗
2 = xi for some i and hence
parties give political salience to diﬀerent issues. Suppose that, on the con-
trary, a∗
2 = qk for some k. Then (a∗
1,a∗
2) = (xk,qk) and player 1 wins with
probability Π(xk,qk) = πx
k. From corollary 1, it must be that πx
k ≤ 1−πx
1.
By deﬁnition, Π(x1,BR(x1)) = min
i>1
{s1iπx
1 + (1 − s1i)(1 − πx
i )} > 1−πx
1,
since πx
1 > 1 − πx
i ≥ 1 − πx
1. But then Π(x1,BR(x1)) > 1 − πx
1 ≥ πx
k, and
so x1 is a better choice than xk for player 1, a contradiction with (xk,qk)
being the equilibrium policies. Therefore, it cannot be that a∗
2 = qk and
parties must give political salience to diﬀerent issues.
￿
E Proof of Theorem 2
1. Let σ1 < 1/2, then πx
1 < 1/2 (proposition 1). From theorem 1, both
parties focus on the same issue. At the subgame Γs (s = w,nw) player
2 always responds by defending the status-quo, hence player 1 chooses
issue 1, the one with the highest probability of victory, and player 2 de-
fends the status-quo qi against any alternative xi. Player 1 wins with
probability πx
1. When deciding whether to take the initiative or wait, the
government compares ΠG(Γw) = 1 − πx
1 ≥ πx
1 = ΠG(Γnw) and chooses
21to wait, where (abusing notation) ΠG(Γs) represents the incumbent gov-
ernment’s expected probability of victory associated to any Nash Equilib-
rium of the subgame Γs. Therefore, at the equilibrium path of the full
game the opposition chooses x1 while the incumbent government defends




1 ) = (0.3,0.1), (Fx
2 ,F
y
2 ) = (0.25,0.2) and Fx
i < Fx
2 for all i > 2.
Observe that 1/2 > πx
1 > πx
2 > πx
i for all i > 2 since πx
j < 1/2 if and only
if Fx
j < 1/2. Hence, since both parties focus on issue 1 at equilibrium and
σ2 = 0.42 > 0.4 = σ1, they do not choose the most salient issue.
2. Let σ1 > 1/2 and ζ1 < (1 − σ1)/σ1. From proposition 1, πx
1 < 1/2. Again,
theorem 1 implies that both parties focus on the same issue. A similar
argument as the one used in the previous case shows that the opposition
chooses the issue 1 and the government waits and defends the status-
quo. Consider the following example. (Fx
1 ,F
y






2 for all i > 2. Observe that σ2 = 0.65 > 0.6 =
σ1 > 1/2 and ζ1 = 0.33 < 0,66 = (1 − σi)/(σi). Hence, both parties
choose issue 1, while issue 2 shows higher salience (although lower level of
policy agreement).
3. Let σ1 > 1/2 and ζ1 > 1/2. From proposition 1, πx
1 > 1/2. By theorem
1, if πx
2 > 1 − πx
1 they focus on diﬀerent issues, otherwise they choose the
same issue. Let k = ϕ−1 (1 − πx
1), that is the electoral support that an
alternative x would need to defeat the status-quo with probability 1−πx
1.
Then, πx
2 > 1 − πx
1 if and only if Fx
2 > k. The inequality Fx
2 > k holds
if and only if σ2 > k and σ2 (1 + ζ2) > k. Therefore, if there exists
another issue with enough salience and policy agreement (namely σ2 > k
and ζ2 > (2k − σ2)/σ2 where k = ϕ−1 (1 − πx
1)) parties focus on diﬀerent
issues, otherwise they both compete on the same issue. As the examples
in sections 5.1 and 5.2 show, they may not choose the most salient, nor
focus on issue 1 and 2.
￿
F Proof of Corollary 2
We know that ρ = maxi minj Π1(xi,xj) and (1−ρ) are the values of the games
Γnw and Γw, respectively, and that the incumbent government can choose the
subgame to play by waiting or taking the initiative. Therefore, the government
will choose the subgame with the highest value and hence its probability of
winning will be max{ρ,1 − ρ} ≥ 1/2. ￿
22G Proof of Proposition 3.
1. By proposition 1, we only need to show that if the incumbent government
chooses the issue G, then πx
G > 1/2. Assume that there exists an issue i
such that σi > 1/2 and ζi > 1/2. Then, πx
i > 1/2 and hence πx
1 > 1/2, as
πx
1 ≥ πx
i for all i .




1, otherwise the government could choose issue 1 at




2 > 1 − πx
1 we know by theorem 1 that parties choose
diﬀerent issues and, by corollary 2, Π∗
G > 1/2 > Π∗
O.
(c) Moreover, it must be that πx
O < 1/2. Otherwise Π∗
G = sGO πx
G +(1−
sGO)(1 − πx
O) < 1/2, a contradiction with the previous step.
(d) If the government does not wait (Γnw), it must be that Π∗
O ≥ siG πx
i +
(1−siG)(1−πx
G) for all i  = G. Since Π∗
O < 1/2 and 1−πx
G ≥ 1/2, it
follows that πx
i ≤ 1/2 for all i  = G. But this is a contradiction with
the initial assumption that πx
1 > 1/2.
(e) If the government waited at equilibrium, the opposition could always





i ) ≤ Π∗
O.Because Π∗
O < 1/2 and πx
1 > 1/2,
it follows that πx
i ≥ 1/2 for all i . But this is a contradiction with
the government choosing an issue with πx
G < 1/2.
Therefore we have proved that at equilibrium πx
G > 1/2. It follows from propo-
sition 1 that σG > 1/2 and that ζG > 1/2. ￿
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